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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. Did the police have exigent circumstances to warrant
entry into the home without a warrant?
2. Did the police have probable cause to arrest appellant?
3. Did the police properly search appellant?
4. Did appellant consent to a search?
5. Was a warrant subsequently obtained valid?

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1. Police had no probable cause to arrest prior to entry.
2. A warrantless entry was illegal because exigent
circumstances were not present.
3. The police illegally searched the person of Northrup.
4. There was no consent to a search.
5. All evidence obtained from the house was fruit of the
poisonous tree.
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BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a conviction and judgment against
Daniel B. Northrup for Possession of a Controlled Substance with
Intent to Distribute and Unlawful Distribution for Value of a
Controlled Substance, felonies under Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8
(1953 as amended)j

also a misdemeanor conviction of Possession

of a Controlled Substance.

Defendant was found guilty of the

above offenses after a bench trial on March 6, 1986, in the Third
District Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable
Philip Fishier, presiding.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
A motion to suppress was made by defendant Northrup and
a hearing was held on January 7, 1986.

Following the hearing,

the judge made the following findings of fact:

1

"... that on the 26th of February, 1985, at 444 South
970 East, also known as Garden Avenue...at about noon or
1 P.M., Officers Beglarian and Rickards conferred with a Mr.
Van Hoiten; gave Mr. Van Hoiten $1,000; and Mr. Van Hoiten then
went into the address, ... [and] returned with ... cocaine.
"That thereafter the person later

determined to be Mr.

Varney left the residence and he was subsequently stopped, and
the officers determined that Mr. Varney did not have in his
possession the $1,000.

The officers at that point in time had

probable cause to believe that a person or persons, one of whom
may have been Dan Banks, was dealing in cocaine in the home in
question.
"... they went to the door [of the home], identified
themselves as police officers; [and then] forced their way into
the home.
"... [A warrant arrived] at about 3 or 4:00 that afternoon [to search the home].

... I'm going to find that based

upon the information that the officers had, which included knowledge
that the money went into the house, the cocaine came out of the
house, that two prior cocaine (quote) buys (unquote) had gone
down in the area of the house ... allowed them to search the home.
... I'm finding basically that the government could have secured
the home, could have entered the home and then secured it from
the

outside, and then obtained a warrant and searched the home

and obtained the very same thing.
"I'm specifically finding that the actual entry to
the home was proper because ... exigent circumstances were that
as soon as people start coming and going from the home, they
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would have to stop, arrest and search every one coming out of the
home to look for money[.]
"... The search of the persons I'm going to find to
be proper.

They had two choices.

They could hold everybody

there and wait for the warrant for these people, a warrant to
search these people, or they could search the people or they could
let the people go. (R. at 84-87)"
On examination, the officers stated that they entered
the premises to retrieve the money they felt was in the house.
(R. at 128)

They were unsure who had the money, so they

arrested the five occupants of the house and searched them and
found $1,000 on appellant.

After finding the money on appellant,

and having arrested him and after having put a gun on him,
appellant agreed to show the officers some things in his room,
but only after having been promised that they would go easy on
him if he did cooperate.

(£. at 137)

Those items were used in

evidence against appellant at trial.
The arresting officer testified at trial that after
arresting appellant and four others for possession of a controlled
substance with an intent to distribute, they discovered the
marked $1,000 in a search incident to the arrest and not during
the initial pat-down of appellant (Trial transcript at 890,
Record at 135). At the suppression hearing, they hinted it was
discovered during a frisk of appellant. (R at 166)
Appellant was convicted based upon evidence admitted
by the court obtained from the entry into the Northrup home.
The evidence used against Northrup consisted almost
exclusively of items secured prior to the arrival of the warrant.
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The probable cause for obtaining the warrant came from
information obtained after entry into the home. (Exhibit 1,
R. 130-132)
ARGUMENT
POINT 1
POLICE HAD NO PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST PRIOR TO ENTRY
Before entry of a private residence for the purposes
of making an arrest, quite obviously, the entry is not lawful
unless the police had grounds to arrest.
496 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1974).

Fisher v. Volz,

In this case, the police did not

know who perpetrated the crime because Mark VanHolten did not
inform them which individual was responsible for the sale of the
drugs.

Thus they had no probable cause to make an arrest of any

particular individual.

The police had no reason to know which

person to arrest.
POINT 2
A WARRANTLESS ENTRY WAS ILLEGAL BECAUSE
EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES WERE NOT PRESENT
The U.S. Supreme Court in Coolidge vs. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443 (1971) , stated that the warrantless entry inside a
man's house is per se unreasonable in the absence of some one of
a number of well defined "exigent circumstances."

Warden v.

Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), the Court added, "... certainly
stands by negative implicabion for the proposition that an arrest
warrant is required in the absence of exigent circumstances."
Coolidge cited Dorman vs. United States, 435 F.2d
385 (D.C. Circ. 1970), where Judge Leventhal, for the majority,
concluded the general rule is that a warrant is ordinarily
required "not only in case of entry to search for property,
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but also in case of entry to arrest a suspect," but found that
exceptional circumstances were present in this case which justified
a warrantless entry.

He then proceeded to list the considerations

material to that conclusion:
"First, that a grave offense is involved, particularly
one that is a crime of violence. * * *
"Second, * * * that the suspect is reasonably believed
to be armed. * * *
"Third, that there exists not merely the minimum of
probable cause that is requisite even when a warrant has been
issued, but beyond that, a clear showing or probable cause,
including 'reasonable trustworthy information,1 to believe that the
suspect committed the crime involved.
"Fourth, strong reason to believe that the suspect is
in the premises being entered.
"Fifth, a likelihood that the suspect will escape if
not swiftly apprehended.
"Sixth, the circumstance that the entry, though not
consented, is made peaceably."
In this case, the offense involved is not a crime of
violence, and there was no reason to believe the suspects were
armed.

In fact, there were numerous vehicles in front of the

house.

They arrested five individuals, and then made their case.
In fact, there is no information upon which they knew

who was a suspect.

Several individuals were in the home and the

police had no idea, let alone probable cause to believe any one
individual inside coramitted the offense over any other individual
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in the home who was male.

There is no showing or probable cause

including "reasonable trustworthy information" to believe who
committed the crime involved.
The circumstances through which the police entered
were anything but peaceable, and they had drawn weapons when they
first knocked at the door.
Part of the definition of exigency as defined by Black's
law dictionary is: an imperativeness or an unforeseen occurrence
or condition; pressing need or demand, et cetera.

In this case,

none of the conduct of defendants was unforeseen nor unexpected
and there was no reason the police could not have done more to
find a suspect short of a violent intrusion into the defendant's
home.
The police entered to retrieve their money without a
warrant. (R. at 128)

They weren't sure who had the money.

A

possible loss of money should not be considered an exigent
circumstance.

The police voluntarily parted with their money.
POINT 3

THE POLICE ILLEGALLY SEARCHED THE PERSON OF NORTHRUP
Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) , the United
States Supreme Court held that the police can only frisk a
person if they believe that person to be armed and dangerous.
If a person is believed to be armed and dangerous, the police
can only search the outer clothing of a person for items which
could be weapons.

The police had no reason to believe though

that the defendant Northrup was armed and dangerous.

Even if

the police thought that the defendant Northrup was armed and
dangerous, the police could not take nor remove evidence unless
they had reason to believe it to be a dangerous weapon under
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State v. O'Neal, 444 P.2d 951 (1968).

The police took from

defendant Northrup money from a pocket by itself. Clearly,
with a pat-down, a police officer can tell that an object that
feels like money is not a weapon.

At the very most, they are

allowed to frisk for weapons and to do further is an unreasonable
search.

It is not more probable than not that defendant Northrup

would have the money versus anyone else in the house.

To conduct

a search of more than a frisk would be unwarranted.
The arresting officer testified at trial that after
arresting appellant and four others for possession of a controlled
substance with intent to distribute, he discovered the marked
bills in a search incident to his arrest and not during the
initial pat-down of appellant.
The retrieval of the money was thus taken in violation
of appellant's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
POINT 4
THERE WAS NO CONSENT TO A SEARCH
According to State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 10 3
(Utah 1980), the prosecution has the burden of establishing
from the totality of the circumstances that a consent to search
is voluntary; factors to be looked at to show a lack of duress
or coercion in obtaining consent include: the absence of a claim
of authority to search by the officers; the absence of an
exhibition of force by the officers, a mere request to search,
cooperation by the owner of the object to be searched, and the
absence of deception or trick on the part of the officers.
In this case, the officers were refused admittance to
the house and then took guns and put them near the head of
Northrup, and made him lie on the floor.
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Although whatever

they subsequently obtained would be in violation of the
poisonous tree doctrine, they told Northrup they would be easy
on him if he showed them some things in his room as they held a
weapon close to his head. (R. at 137) This shows duress and
coercion.
POINT 5
ALL EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE HOUSE
WAS FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE
Suppression of fruit of an illegal search and seizure
has been mandated to purge the taint of Fourth Amendment violations.

Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 1963.

In this

case, the combination of factors gives rise to meritorious
issues which should be decided by the appellate court.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the appellant Daniel B.
Northrup, asks this Court to reverse his convictions and remand
this case to the District Court.
Respectfully submitted this ) \ , day of May, 1987.

?..,K/

*

{„^^//

DAVID L. GRINDSTAFF
*/
Attorney for Appellant/Defendant
Daniel B. Northrup
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ADDENDUM "A"

IN THE FIFTH CIRCUITcoURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SEARCH WARRANT
No.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
To any p e a c e o f f i c e r i n t h e S t a t e of Utah.
Proof by A f f i d a v i t under o a t h h a v i n g been made t h i s day b e f o r e me by
Bruce
Bennion
, I am s a t i s f i e d t h a t t h e r e i s p r o b a b l e c a u s e t o b e l i e v e
That

( ) on t h e p e r s o n ( s ) of
( ) i n t h e v e h i c l e (s) d e s c r i b e d as
fc# on t h e p r e m i s e s known a s 4 4 4 1

Garden D s i v e ,

a white

frma

house with a red roof located a t approximately 4441 Snnt-1
970 East
__
In the City of
S a l t Lake
S a l t Lake
f County of
State of Utah, there i s now being possessed or concealed certain p r o p e r t y or
evidence described a s :

"Narcotics paraphernalia consisting of s c a l e s , screens, mirrors,
p l a s t i c bags, bongs, razor blades and pipes; and q u a n t i t i e s of
marijuana, hashish, psilocybin mushrooms and approximately 10
grams, more or l e s s , of cocaine"
which property or evidence:
( x ) was unlawfully acquired or i s unlawfully possessed.
( x ) has been used to commit or conceal a public o f f e n s e .
( x ) i s being possessed with the purpose to use i t as a means of
committing or concealing a public o f f e n s e .
( x ) c o n s i s t s of an item or c o n s t i t u t e s evidence of i l l e g a l conduct,
possessed by a party t o the i l l e g a l conduct.
( ) i s evidence of i l l e g a l conduct in p o s s e s s i o n of a person or
e n t i t y not a party to the i l l e g a l conduct and good cause being
shown that the s e i z u r e cannot be obtained by subpoena WJ thoul
the evidence being concealed, d e s t r o y e d , damaged, or a l t e r e d .
(Conditions for service of t h i s warrant are included or a t t a c h e d
hereto.)
You are therefore commanded:
( ) in the day time
(x) at any time day or night (good cause having been shown)
( ) to execute without notice of authority or purpose, (proof
under oath being shown that the object of this search may
be quickly destroyed or disposed of or that harm may result
to any person if notice were given)
Q

f

PAGE TWO
SEARCH WARRANT

to make a search of the above-named or described person(s), vehicle(s), and
pn mi i.e. for the* herein-above described property or evidence and if you find
the same or any part thereof, to bring it forthwith before me at the Fifth
Circuit
Court, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, or retain such property in your custody, subject to the order of this court,
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND and dated this ^

0?

day of

/

Februar^

, 19 85 ,

/

JUDGE, JUSTICE OP" THE PEACE, OR
MAGISTRATE OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
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DAVID L. G R I N D S T A F F M
Attorney for Appellant
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